民進黨駐美代表處：馬英九混淆美國的一中政策【自由時報】 - 伊莉討論區

yes311 發表於 2017-3-8 03:17 PM
真好笑！！
你們發這篇是自打嘴巴嗎？

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 03:21 PM
閱讀障礙啊，為啥論壇上綠蛆閱讀障礙患者這麼多，到底是因為它們是沒能力閱讀才成為綠蛆，還是因為它們是 ...

yes311 發表於 2017-3-8 03:34 PM
對你們五毛來說，有用的時候都說我們是中國人！！
等沒有處的時候，你們都是日本皇民綠蛆日畜留島 ...

cjl20070320 發表於 2017-3-8 05:40 PM
你如果不是個獨立的國家,美國會讓你設立代表處嗎??
又不見中國各個省份出國去設立代表處??
口號喊爽的嗎??

2013年1月1日美國國務院在其出版的《有效條約彙編》中表示：「美國不承認『中華民國』是一個國家或政府[125]」。
2014年12月11日美國國會研究服務部發表報告：「美國有自己的『一個中國』政策（相對於中華人民共和國的『一個中國』原則）和對臺灣地位的立場。既不承認中華人民共和國對臺灣的主張也不承認臺灣是一個主權國家，美國的政策認為臺灣地位未定」、「美國沒有在1972年、1979年、1982年的美中三個聯合公報中對臺灣的主權狀態表明態度。美國僅僅『認知』海峽兩岸的『一個中國』立場[126]」。
2016年12月5日前美國在臺協會臺北辦事處處長司徒文表示，美國過去「一個中國」的政策是錯的，他強調美國從來都沒說過中國對臺灣擁有主權[127]

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 07:23 PM
美國的立場從頭到尾都很明確，美國認知支那國的立場，但是台灣地位未定論，支那國亂也沒用，領土是打來的 ...

In August 1995 (earlier than the first public statements showed in 1997), President Clinton sent a secret letter to PRC President Jiang Zemin to state that the United States:
(1) would “oppose”Taiwan independence;
(2) would not support “two Chinas” or one China and one Taiwan;
and
(3)would not support Taiwan’s admission to the U.N.26 The opposition to Taiwan independence seemed to go beyond the promises made by former National Security Advisor Henry Kissingerand President Nixon in 1971 and 1972 of no U.S. support for Taiwan independence. Later, thatwording was apparently changed from opposition to a neutral stance of non-support. This letterreportedly formed the basis of what were later known publicly as the “Three Noes.”

The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, argued that the “Three Noes” did not represent a change
in policy. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 25, 1999, Assistant
Secretary of State Stanley Roth stated that “every point made there [in the “Three Noes”] had
been made before by a previous Administration and there was no change whatsoever.” In a
written response to a question from Senator Helms, Roth cited as precedents for the “Three Noes”
a 1971 statement by Kissinger, a 1972 statement by Nixon, a 1979 statement by Deputy Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, and President Reagan’s 1982 Communique.

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 09:45 PM
看不懂，我可以幫助翻譯，就怕你們的玻璃心又碎了一地

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 09:57 PM
有玻璃心的是你吧？這些東東我早就看過了

美國不支援一中一台或者二個中國，但是台灣不是支那的領土，這 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 10:14 PM
另外，美國對台灣的命運上只是對結果不做預定，只是在方式上期望是兩岸和平解決。至于你想認美爹或想認日 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 10:23 PM
你自己的回文心得都翻譯成美國"認知"了，還嘴什麼？

-.-你自認懂英文也沒翻錯，還自己在那邊鬼打牆，真 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 10:11 PM
拉几把倒吧，美國支持或者承認台灣是中國的領土，但只是在中國這個概念上模糊。你還看過呢，你看過個屁 ...

上acknowledge的英語課

依一九七三年版之「Webster's Dictionary」有關「acknowledge」字之用法解釋，包括:

（一） to show by word or act that one has knowledge of and agrees to (a fact or truth)

   以言詞或行動表示得知並承認(事實或真實)。

（二） concede to be real or true

   承認為真實。

（三） to show by word or act that one has knowledge of and respect for the rights, claims, authority, or status of

   以言詞或行動表示得知並尊重「權利」、「主張」、「根據」、「狀態」。

（四） to take notice of: indicate recognition and acceptance of

   禮遇：表示「承認」並且「接受」。

由「Webster's Dictionary」之解釋，可以推知:

當 acknowledge 之受詞是基於己方觀點(主觀)為真實之陳述時，「見（二)」，acknowledge 是等同 recognize，為「承認」之意。然而，

當 acknowledge 之受詞是基於客方觀點(客觀)為參考之主張時「見（三)」，acknowledge 不等同 recognize，為「得知並尊重」之意。

依據上述「acknowledge」用法之原則，來解讀美中三個公報，就能夠真正清楚美國政府想法與用意：

1. 一九七二年二月二十八日「美中上海公報」原文：

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.

這句之英文結構可分解為:

A. The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China.

在本句子中，美國所「acknowledge」之受詞是台海兩岸中國人對一個中國之主張，其為「客觀」，是以解讀為「得知」。

B. The United States acknowledges that Taiwan is a part of China.

在本句子中，美國所「acknowledge」之受詞是美國對台灣歸屬之陳述，其為「主觀」，是以解讀為「承認」。

2. 一九七九年一月一日「美中建交公報」及一九八二年八月十七日「美中八一七公報」

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

在本句子中，美國所「acknowledge」之受詞，是中國對一個中國及台灣歸屬之主張，其為「客觀」，是以解讀為「得知」。

本土台灣人從初中（國中）開始就學英文（甚至更早），第二年起學習英文文法，大學畢業以後，很多人也會去美國留學，大部分都學有專精，唯獨英文文法是門不易專精的學問，因為，本土台灣人不是土生土長的美國人，許多當地狸語、習慣用語都是學習者的罩門，這樣一來，當英文要變成中文時，翻譯或解釋就會各唱各個調，查字典或問問真正的美國英語教師，應該會是好方法，您說對不對？

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-8 10:36 PM
認知與外交承認本來就是兩回事, 數十年來美國一直出售武器給台灣, 承認才有鬼. ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 10:43 PM
你要好好看書，不要一直打嘴炮...

尤其嘴炮打輸就喊停..真的很搞笑!!

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 10:51 PM
美國的立場自二戰後就是台灣地位未定論了

民進黨清楚.國民黨也清楚...支那國應該更清楚才對

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-8 11:01 PM
蔣介石只是根據麥帥第一號命令接收台灣, 而攸關主權地位的移轉, 並未出現在舊金山和約.

建交公報, 只是各 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 10:57 PM
拉倒糾結了解和承認有個屁意義。
實際上三個公報中除了acknowledges” that “all Chinese on both sides ...

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-8 11:01 PM
蔣介石只是根據麥帥第一號命令接收台灣, 而攸關主權地位的移轉, 並未出現在舊金山和約.

建交公報, 只是各 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 11:15 PM
美國一直對台灣軍售,甚至還要對台灣駐軍,這就是完全不屌支那國所謂的立場了啊

美國一直以來的立場就是台 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 11:12 PM

body007 發表於 2017-3-8 11:21 PM
當時蔣家政權跟中共政權在爭中國這個名字，而且各自堅持自己才是代表中國的正統，所以美國不管是承認還是尊 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 11:20 PM
我當然知道美國啥立場，美國的一中政策和中國的一中原則差別不大，如同報告中所說所謂的三不原則還有靠攏 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 11:24 PM
有本事讓美中去簽署新的公報，在那之前，所謂美國的一中政策，就是這個意思。馬前地區領導人沒有混淆，混 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 11:37 PM
美國是一中政策沒錯,但那不等於中國的一中原則

一中一台本來就是自由時報在幻想的，台灣的國際地位只是 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-8 11:49 PM
軍事佔領期早就結束了，最遲到中日和約，就不存在什麼軍事佔領問題了，至於剩餘領土，就更搞笑了。所謂的 ...

美國官網承認1952年簽署的舊金山和平條約,日本對台灣有剩餘主權.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952–1954VOLUME XIV, PART 2, CHINA AND JAPAN (IN TWO PARTS), DOCUMENT 595美國的外交關係 1952-1954第14冊第2部,中國和日本(在兩個部分),文件595,794C.0221/8–2952No. 595The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of StateWashington, 29 August 1952.美國國防部副部長(Foster)對美國國務卿1952年8月29日華盛頓.4. In Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, Japan renounced right, title and claimto Korea, Formosa, the Kuriles, Sakhalin, the Mandated Islands, Antarcticarea, the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. It may be inferred thatultimate Japanese sovereignty was recognized over the islands she agreed toplace in trusteeship. This conception was conceded by Mr. Dulles (page 78,Dept. State Publication 4392)8 and by Mr. Younger, the U.K. delegate (page93, Dept. State Publication 4392). Mr. Dulles speaks of the current Japaneseposition as 「residual sovereignty」.在SFPT第2條,日本放棄對朝鮮,福爾摩沙,千島群島,庫頁島,南洋群島,南極區域,西沙群島,南沙群島的權利,資格,和主張,這可推斷日本承認對於這些島嶼擁有最終的主權而她同意置於託管制度.這個概念由杜勒斯和英國的委任代表楊格先生所承認(page 78,93,美國國務院公報4392)杜勒斯演講對於日本當時的立場是"剩餘主權".

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 11:56 PM
台灣地位未定論，台灣還是美國的軍事領地啊！啊不然美國怎麼拆走台灣核武..美國空軍還能自由停降台灣補給. ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-8 11:19 PM
2300萬人???

在台中國人能算台灣人嗎??他們願意當台灣人嗎..

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 12:00 AM
只對一點，給你嘴確實沒有用，我不可能教會頭豬

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794C.0221/8–2952
No. 595
The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State
Washington, 29 August 1952.

top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to me dated 15 August 1952, submitted recommendations concerning U.S. policies in the Ryukyus and Bonin-Volcano Islands in the post-Treaty period. A copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum is attached for your information. The JCS memorandum is the result of questions raised by representatives of the Department of State at an informal discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after considering possible courses of action in connection with the disposition of the Ryukyus and Bonin-Volcano Islands, that there should be no change in the status of the islands 「until such time as the politico-military situation in the Far East becomes stabilized in a way favorable to U.S. security interests.」 I fully concur in this view.
[Page 1319]

National Security Council document 125/2 「United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan」,1 calls for recommendations by the Departments of State and Defense to the President concerning the long-term military requirements of the United States in and about the Ryukyus, Bonins, and other islands covered by Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan. In accordance with the required action in the NSC policy on Japan, it is suggested that the representatives of our respective Departments develop a recommended U.S. Government position on the islands for submission to the President. If you agree, I am prepared to designate appropriate Department of Defense representatives to work on this problem.

Sincerely yours,
William C. Foster

[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)
Washington, 15 August 1952.

top secret
Subject:

Future Post-Peace Treaty Disposition of Ryukyu and Bonin-Volcano Islands.

1.
During a recent informal discussion between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the question was raised by the Department of State representatives as to the advisability, from a political standpoint, of the United States signifying its intention to return some or all of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to Japan, possibly retaining only Okinawa under United Nations trusteeship. After some discussion, it was agreed that representatives from the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should meet to analyze the problem and submit recommendations as to the future disposition of the islands in question.
2.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have repeatedly held that strategic control of the Nansei Shoto south of 29° N latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands and the Volcano Islands), Parece Vela, and Marcus Island is vital to the security interests of the United States, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not concur in action to return these islands to Japan, and that no change in United States policy in regard to these islands should be contemplated
[Page 1320]
until a condition of stability has been firmly established in the Far East.
3.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered:

a.
      The most recent trends and events in the Far East;
b.
      The recently approved United States policy toward Southeast Asia (NSC 124/2); and
c.
      The uncertainties of a United Nations trusteeship over this strategic area in the event that Japan becomes a member of the United Nations.

In the light of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now of the opinion that, for the foreseeable future, a trusteeship would not provide adequate assurance that the long-term military objectives in connection with these islands will be realized. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now consider that there should be no change in the status quo of the islands in question until such time as the politico-military situation in the Far East becomes stabilized in a way favorable to United States security interests.
4.
It is recommended that, subject to your concurrence, the foregoing view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be conveyed to the Secretary of State, further stating that the Department of Defense is prepared to furnish representatives for a State–Defense working group, if it is considered necessary by the Department of State, to prepare a recommended U.S. Governmental position on this matter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a firm, early decision on the subject matter is necessary. If such a working group is formed, it is recommended that the attached 「Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion,」 developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff be used by the Department of Defense representatives on the proposed working group as a basis for discussion.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Enclosure

Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion

1.
On 17 October 1951, CINCFE recommended the following conclusions 「be approved by the J.C.S. as a basis for implementing action at an appropriate later date」:2 that the security of the strategically vital U.S. position along the offshore island chain in the
[Page 1321]
Western Pacific is in no way dependent upon perpetuation of U.S. political control over the Ryukyu Islands; that such political responsibility would serve not only to burden the United States with an economic liability but will stand as a denial to the principle of self determination and might at a later date develop into an irritant to the Japanese; that a U.S. sponsored movement for the return of control over the Ryukyu Islands to the Japanese would constitute an additional step toward cementing U.S.-Japanese security objectives; that action should be deferred until the treaty has been ratified; and that a firm agreement should be reached with Japan to retain our exclusive control of military facilities. The recommendation of CINCFE was signed by Lt. Gen. Hickey, Chief of Staff, and added that the conclusions are also applicable to Parece Vela, Marcus Island and Nanpo Shoto.
2.
On 21 January 1952, acting on CINCFE's recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their consistently held position that 「strategic control of the Nansei Shoto has been and continues to be vital to the security interests of the United States」, that they 「could not concur in action to return these islands to Japan」, and that 「no change in U.S. policy in regard to Nansei Shoto, Nanpo Shoto, Marcus Island and Parece Vela should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established in the Far East」.3CINCFE was informed4 that action with respect to his recommendations should not be undertaken now or in the foreseeable future.
3.
The policy of the United States has been expressed in the following:

a.
      Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945: 「The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out, and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine」.5
b.
      The President in a broadcast on 6 [9] August 1945: 「… though the United States wants no territory, or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace. Bases which our military experts deem essential for our protection and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will
      [Page 1322]
      acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.」6
c.
      The President on 6 November 1946: 「The United States is prepared to place under Trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese Mandated Islands and any Japanese islands for which it assumes responsibility as a result of the second World War.」7
d.
      Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan: 「Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.」

4.
In Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, Japan renounced right, title and claim to Korea, Formosa, the Kuriles, Sakhalin, the Mandated Islands, Antarctic area, the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. It may be inferred that ultimate Japanese sovereignty was recognized over the islands she agreed to place in trusteeship. This conception was conceded by Mr. Dulles (page 78, Dept. State Publication 4392)8 and by Mr. Younger, the U.K. delegate (page 93, Dept. State Publication 4392). Mr. Dulles speaks of the current Japanese position as 「residual sovereignty」.
5.
The following facts and opinions were expressed in an interview with Brig. Gen. J.M. Lewis, U.S. Army, U.S. Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands:

a.
      A spot survey of one of the northern islands in the Amami Group indicated that 99 per cent of the people desired return to Japanese sovereignty. In view of the facts that these islands were formerly an integral part of the Kagoshima province of southern Kyushu and that the people were closely related culturally, economically and ethnologically to the mainlanders, and considered themselves higher socially than the people of more southern islands, the results of the poll were not unexpectedly in favor of return to Japan. Recently there has been no concrete evidence of a determined movement for the return of the area to Japan, possibly because of removal of many previous restrictions. This feeling for
      [Page 1323]
      return to Japan diminishes generally in a southerly direction and inland to rural areas amongst the islands south of the Amami Group. Although no over-all poll of the islands has ever been made, it was estimated that not over 50 per cent desire immediate return to Japanese sovereignty.
b.
      The Amami group is distinct culturally and historically from the rest of the Ryukyu Islands. Economically and historically these people feel that they are more closely related to Japan, specifically Kogoshima Prefecture, than they are to Okinawa and the other southern islands. They resent the undisputed fact that Okinawa will exert a dominant control over government, banking, trade and education in the Ryukyu Islands of which they are now considered a part. The return of the Amami group to Japan would not create a serious economic dislocation in the Ryukyus although some 20,000 laborers have moved temporarily to Okinawa as a result of the military construction program there. The return of the Amami group to Japan would remove a difficult political and social problem in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands by the United States. From a political, governmental and social standpoint, it is desirable that this northern group be returned to the Japanese Empire.
c.
      General Lewis emphasized the importance of the United States publicly announcing its intentions with respect to the island groups. He indicated that the natives are definitely opposed to trusteeship which they associate with the former mandate status of more southern islands and regard as an unacceptable, degrading and despotic form of rule. An established U.S. definitive position would dispel a lot of conjecture and speculation on the part of Okinawans and facilitate the establishment of democratic governmental processes therein.
d.
      General Lewis also expressed the view that if the United States is planning to return the islands to Japan, the transfer should not be effected until (1) the Korean war is over, and (2) Japan is economically and militarily capable of assuming this added responsibility. Obviously neither of these conditions exist today. Even if the Korean war ends soon, it is unlikely Japan could provide for the defense and support of the outer-islands in addition to the home islands without materially decreasing the over-all security of the area.

6.
Japanese national desires regarding the Ryukyu-Bonin Islands are believed to be generally those expressed in a letter dated 10 December 1951, subject 「Practicable Arrangements for the Southern Islands,」9 which was passed informally by State Department to Department of Army and attached hereto as Appendix. This letter, which allegedly was presented to the U.S. Political Advisor for Japan by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, visualizes the restoration by the United States of the previous sovereign relation
[Page 1324]
between Japan and the Southern Islands so far as compatible with U.S. military requirements.
7.
The maximum U.S. base requirements in the area will exist under conditions of war in the Far East with either USSR or Communist China, in which bases in Japan would not be available, and are estimated as follows:

a.
      Ryukyus

      (1)
         Army—Present facilities to include those for 3 AAA Bns, 1 RCT and supporting units plus the additional defense and support requirements generated by the expanded requirements of the sister services.
      (2)
         Navy—Present air facility on Air Force Field at Naha, Air Station at Yonabaru together with a fleet anchorage, secondary operating base and facility at Buckner Bay.
      (3)
         Air Force—Continued use of four Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Group sites on outer-islands together with the requirement for 7 operating bases on Okinawa, only three of which are firmly located at present.

b.
      Bonin-Volcano Islands

      (1)
         Army—Defense and support requirements generated by the requirements of the sister Services.
      (2)
         Navy—Naval facility at Chi Chi Jima, air facility at Iwo Jima and an advanced base at Ha Ha Jima.
      (3)
         Air Force—One refueling base and an AC&W site.

c.
      Marcus Island

      (1)
         Army and Air Force—None.
      (2)
         Navy—One naval air facility.

8.
The fundamental issue boils down to whether or not security interests are sufficient to override the United States and United Nations policies of national self determination. (The economic costs of retaining the islands are considered minor in comparison with security advantages.) From a military standpoint, there is no question as to the great value of the subject islands as bases or bulwarks in stemming Communist aggression in the Far East, and ultimately in defending the United States. The United States must have bases that are not dependent upon the temporary political position of Japan, and which are relatively proof against Communist invasion.
9.
On 30 Janurary 1952, the Secretary of State outlined the possible U.S. courses of action in the Ryukyus (DA IN 103951, 12 February 1952) as follows:10

      「(1) The United States, immediately after the effective date of the Treaty, may 『exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters'. In this event, the Ryukyus
      [Page 1325]
      would be considered as being under the 『protection' of the United States within the meaning of the Chicago Convention,11 and thus would be considered to be 『territory' of the United States.
      「(2) The United States may propose to the United Nations to have the Ryukyu placed under the United Nations trusteeship system with the United States as the sole administering authority. If such a trusteeship were granted, the island would probably be considered to fall within the above definition of 『territory' in as much as the United Nations 『trusteeship' system has succeeded the old League of Nations 『mandate' system.
      「(3) At some point in the future the United States may return the Ryukyus to Japan after a security arrangement has been made between the United States and Japan which would ensure that adequate protection is given to U.S. strategic interests in the Ryukyus. In this instance, the Ryukyus would be considered as territory of Japan within the definition of 『territory' in the Chicago Convention. This possibility should of course not be discussed publicly.」

10.
Adding two additional courses, the following courses of action which retain U.S. base rights, are possible.

a.
      Maintain Status Quo
b.
      Trusteeship
c.
      Return with Base Rights Agreements
d.
      Joint Sovereignty with Japan
e.
      Annex to the United States

11.
Maintain Status Quo

a.
      Advantages

      (1)
         Would not require U.N. action which USSR could block.
      (2)
         Affords complete military control.
      (3)
         Continues present flexibility of U.S. policy (which allows U.S. full freedom of action in the disposition of these islands).
      (4)
         Reserves decision at the present time (when no clear advantages would flow to the U.S. as a consequence of either requesting a U.N. mandate or returning these islands to Japanese political control).

b.
      Disadvantages

      (1)
         An economic liability.
      (2)
         Not in accord with Japanese nationalistic desires and hence an irritant to Japan.
      (3)
         Leaves status of territory undefined—various decisions will be required to alleviate the current status of the inhabitants.

12.
Trusteeship
[Page 1326]

a.
      Advantages

      (1)
         Has been the announced U.S. policy.
      (2)
         Subject to possible USSR veto in the UN Security Council, could be accomplished under existing treaties.
      (3)
         Subject to effects of obstruction tactics by the USSR, would afford adequate military control.
      (4)
         Firmly establishes status of territory with UN approval.

b.
      Disadvantages

      (1)
         An economic liability.
      (2)
         An approval required, which USSR might block.
      (3)
         If Japan were subsequently admitted to the United Nations, would be subject to challenge under Art. 78, UN Charter, which states trusteeship 「shall not apply to territories which have become members of the UN.」 (Note: Challenge not likely to be upheld in the light of Article III of the Peace Treaty with Japan, considered in conjunction with Article 77 of the United Nations Charter.)

13.
Unless the United States could accept as a long-term objective the development of these islands toward self-government or independence, an objective which is not likely to be acceptable from a military point of view within the foreseeable future, the seeking of a trusteeship would not be in accord with the spirit of Article 76* of the United Nations Charter.
14.
Because of the use which the United States, as administering authority, would intend to make of the islands, all or part of the area would undoubtedly be designated as 「『strategic」 (Article 82† of the United Nations Charter). Under the terms of Article 83‡ of the United Nations Charter, all functions of the United Nations relating to the area so designated would be exercised by the Security Council and therefore subject to Russian veto. This consideration
[Page 1327]
makes it doubtful that a request by the United States for a trusteeship over strategic areas of the islands would receive favorable action by the United Nations. Even if such a trusteeship were to be granted, it is foreseen that the United States would be constantly harassed in the administration of the trusteeship by the blocking tactics of the USSR in the Security Council.
15.
Congress has always been reluctant to appropriate funds for the construction of base facilities on other than United States territory except in those cases where the continued availability on a long-term basis of the base area involved appears to be assured. A United Nations trusteeship which might be subject to challenge and annulment if and when Japan becomes a member of the United Nations would not appear to offer to the Congress the necessary assurance of long-term tenure. The fact that considerable funds are being spent by the Department of Defense for permanent construction in the islands under consideration points up the necessity for early decision in this matter.
16.
Return to Japan with base rights agreements or joint sovereignty with Japan would be unsatisfactory, since the bases would be relatively useless in war if Japan were hostile, and might involve difficulties even if Japan were neutral.
17.
Annex to the United States. Such a course of action is considered politically unacceptable in view of the fundamental and frequently expressed U.S. policy of self-determination; and is particularly so in the current situation in which the free nations are attempting to check Soviet aggression.
18.
From the military point of view and in the light of the foregoing considerations, maintenance of the status quo is, for the foreseeable future, the only acceptable means for assuring the accomplishment of U.S. security objectives with respect to the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands. While a policy of maintenance of the status quo might, in the absence of preventive action to condition the Japanese public, constitute an irritant to friendly U.S.-Japanese relations, it does provide the major advantage of retaining U.S. freedom of action until such time, unlike the present, when concrete and important advantages may accrue to the U.S. from a decision affecting the disposition of these islands. This policy is considered preferable to taking a positive step at this time to request a U.S. trusteeship over this area with the United States as sole administering authority. All factors considered, the maintenance of the status quo is believed the best course of action to accomplish U.S. objectives for the foreseeable future.

Document 588.↩
Reference is to the study summarized in the first paragraph of Document 488.↩
The document quoted has not been found in Department of State files. However, the views of the Joint Chiefs are contained in the letter cited in footnote 4 below.↩
Letter dated Jan. 29, not printed, from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Army Staff for Operations, signed by Maj. Gen. C.D. Eddleman, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, to CINCFE. (Enclosure to letter from Sebald to McClurkin, Feb. 27, 794C.0221/2–2752)↩
For text of the Proclamation by the Heads of Government of China, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. ii, pp. 1474–1476.↩
For text of this address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 203–214.↩
For text of the 「Statement by the President Concerning the Japanese Mandated Islands」, see ibid., 1946, p. 474.↩
Department of State, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings, September 4–8, 1951 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951).↩
See despatch 1021 from Tokyo, Document 477.↩
Source of quotation not found in Department of State files.↩

For text of the Convention on international civil aviation, opened for signature at Chicago on Dec. 7, 1944, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1591, or 61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1180.

Article 2 of this Convention reads: 「For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.」
↩

Article 76. 「The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article I of the present Charter, shall be:
      「a. To further international peace and security;
      「b. To promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
      「c.…
      「d.…」 [Footnote and ellipses in the source text.]

↩
Article 82. 「There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.」 [Footnote in the source text.]↩

Article 83. 「1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

「2. …

「3. …」 [Footnote and ellipses in the source text.]

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 12:04 AM
你看你,又開始罵人了,身為一個人的素質哪去了...

你對得起你的老師父母嗎?我看你家庭也不錯,怎麼就這麼 ...

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-9 12:04 AM
兄的理念小弟瞭解. 不過國家以武力而圈成, 國防所及之地即為國土. 台灣目前的確是一個主權獨立的國家.

...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 12:12 AM
好吧我再嘗試下教教豬。

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 12:04 AM
你看你,又開始罵人了,身為一個人的素質哪去了...

你對得起你的老師父母嗎?我看你家庭也不錯,怎麼就這麼 ...

In Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, Japan renounced right, title
and claim to Korea, Formosa, the Kuriles, Sakhalin, the Mandated
Islands, Antarctic area, the Spratly Islands and the Paracel
Islands. It may be inferred that ultimate Japanese sovereignty
was recognized over the islands she agreed to place in trusteeship.
This conception was conceded by Mr. Dulles (page 78,Dept. State
Publication 4392)8 and by Mr. Younger, the U.K. delegate (page
93, Dept. State Publication 4392). Mr. Dulles speaks of the
current Japanese position as “residual sovereignty”.

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 12:12 AM
推翻掉中華民國殖民政府本來就不需要武力革命，事實上，它已經內外交逼了..只是我們台灣人遲遲沒有動作

...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 12:23 AM
.
這段話怎麼翻譯，很簡單，日本放棄了日本放棄對朝鮮,福爾摩沙,千島群島,庫頁島,南洋群島,
南極區域,西 ...

台灣澎湖地位等同千島群島地位等同琉球群島地位,舊金山和平條約實踐波次坎宣言內容.In Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, Japan renounced right, title and claim toKorea, Formosa, the Kuriles, Sakhalin, the Mandated Islands, Antarctic area,the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. It may be inferred that ultimateJapanese sovereignty was recognized over the islands she agreed to place intrusteeship. This conception was conceded by Mr. Dulles (page 78, Dept. StatePublication 4392)8and by Mr. Younger, the U.K. delegate (page 93, Dept. StatePublication 4392). Mr. Dulles speaks of the current Japanese position as 「residual sovereignty」.在SFPT第2條,日本放棄對朝鮮,福爾摩沙,千島群島,庫頁島,南洋群島,南極區域,西沙群島,南沙群島的權利,資格,和主張,這可推斷日本承認對於這些島嶼擁有最終的主權而她同意置於託管制度.這個概念由杜勒斯和英國的委任代表楊格先生所承認(page 78,93,美國國務院公報4392)杜勒斯談及日本當時的立場是"剩餘主權".

Proclamation, paragraph (8), reads 「The terms of the CairoDeclaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited tothe islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands aswe determine.」 The Cairo Declaration referred specifically only to 「theterritories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa andthe Pescadores」, although it did add 「Japan will also be expelled from allother territories which she has taken by violence and greed.」 The SanFrancisco Peace Treaty amounts to a 「determination」 by the Allied Powers asto the 「minor islands」 which Japan is to renounce. By its terms Japanrenounced (a) certain islands off Korea; (b) Formosa and the Pescadores; (c)the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin and adjacent islands; (d) the League ofNation's Mandate System; (e) the Antarctic area; and (f) the Spratley andParacel Islands. In other words, the Treaty appears to be an implementationof the precise terms of the Potsdam Proclamation rather than an attempt tocarry out the vague provision of the Cairo Declaration regarding territoriestaken by violence and greed.在坡次坦公告第八段顯示"開羅宣言條款必須實行且日本主權應被限制在本州島,北海道島,九州島,四國島,和我們決定諸如次要的島嶼."開羅宣言具體的只被提交於"這些領土是從中國偷來的,例如滿州,福爾摩沙與澎湖",儘管他只增加"日本也將被驅趕從所有由暴力和貪婪取得的其他土地."舊金山和平條約產生一個由盟軍"決定"的結果,至於提到日本放棄的"次要的島嶼".在此款內日本放棄(a)確切以韓國為稱的島嶼;(b)福爾摩沙和澎湖;(c)千島群島,南庫頁島和毗連的島嶼;(d)國際聯盟託管系統;(e)南極地區;和(f)南沙和西沙島嶼.換句話說,條約顯露出一個精確履行的波次坦公告條款而不是企圖實踐開羅宣言中就領土是由暴力和貪婪所取得而論的不明確之條款.The United States cannot consistently take the position that Japan has notrenounced the Kuriles, any more than she could take the position that she hadnot renounced Formosa and the Pescadores. She must, in view of the positiontaken by the Secretary and by the United States Senate, contend that theirdisposition is for future international action. It would be perfectlyconsistent for the United States to support Japan in the argument that theseislands, or part of them, should be returned to Japan by internationalaction, such as an accord among the Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union.

美國不能一貫的持有日本不再放棄千島群島的立場,相較於它(日本)可以持有它沒有放棄福爾摩沙與澎湖的立場.它必須,考慮到在國務院和美國參議院持有的立場,堅決主張他們的處置是交由未來的國際行動.它將完美一致的符合美國支持日本在這些島嶼的爭議,或是他們的部分,應該藉由國際行動歸還給日本,例如一個在同盟國包括蘇聯的協議.(也就是說他將來可以歸還給日本的,法理上日本現在扔然擁有台灣澎湖的剩餘主權)

The Secretary reminded Mr. Shigemitsu that the Kuriles and Ryukyus werehandled in the same manner under the surrender terms and that while theUnited States had by the peace treaty agreed that residual sovereignty to theRyukyus might remain with Japan, we had also stipulated by Article 26 that ifJapan gave better terms to Russia we could demand the same terms forourselves. That would mean that if Japan recognized that the Soviet Union wasentitled to full sovereignty over the Kuriles we would assume that we wereequally entitled to full sovereignty over the Ryukyus.國務卿提醒重光揆先生千島群島和琉球在投降條款的處理是相同的方式且當美國在和平條約同意日本可能對琉球保留剩餘主權,我們也在26條規定假如日本給予蘇聯更好的條款我們也可以要求對我們同樣的條款.這代表假如日本承認蘇聯是給予千島群島完整的主權,我們主張對我們同樣給予琉球群島的完整主權.

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:00 AM
你沒看懂法律意涵???

領土的主權還有一個移轉的過程，你沒看書？

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-9 12:56 AM
中華民國在兩蔣時代, 說她是殖民政權, 就個人的理解, 除了蔣經國後期的改革部分, 可能連日本殖民都不如.
...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:00 AM
你沒看懂法律意涵???

領土的主權還有一個移轉的過程，你沒看書？

The United States cannot consistently take the position that Japan has notrenounced the Kuriles, any more than she could take the position that she hadnot renounced Formosa and the Pescadores. She must, in view of the positiontaken by the Secretary and by the United States Senate, contend that theirdisposition is for future international action. It would be perfectlyconsistent for the United States to support Japan in the argument that theseislands, or part of them, should be returned to Japan by internationalaction, such as an accord among the Allied Powers, including the Soviet Union.

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 01:23 AM
又胡扯什麼，日本放棄的領土，不管放棄領土是誰接管都和日本無任何關係，至於所謂的剩餘領土，只適用於哪 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 01:31 AM
這句話的翻譯是美國不能一直採取「日本尚未放棄千島群島」的立場，一如不能採取」日本尚未放棄臺澎「的立 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:31 AM
美國軍事敕令蔣中正接管,這只是蔣中正代表美國軍政府統治台灣，這是有治權的法律效力的

但是並沒有主權

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 01:35 AM
對日本只敢說台灣未定論（那是日本自己打的小九九），但不敢說日本對台灣有啥剩余主權。只有你這類傻逼才 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:33 AM
那是翻譯機翻譯的吧？？我只是轉貼而已．．看來你的智商很低...

並不止是英文程度不好...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:31 AM
美國軍事敕令蔣中正接管,這只是蔣中正代表美國軍政府統治台灣，這是有治權的法律效力的

但是並沒有主權

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 01:38 AM
不是翻譯機翻譯，是正確的翻譯。翻譯成「美國不能一貫的持有日本不再放棄千島群島的立場,相較於它(日本) ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:27 AM
中華民國跟日本殖民性質是一樣的

日本殖民後來也開放選舉了，林獻堂也成了貴族院的台灣代表了，可是這有 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:37 AM
日本國主張的台灣地位未定論,就是本著舊金山和約的立場，所以無法決定台灣的主權歸向，也不能聲明，但是 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 01:41 AM
再給你講八百遍，所謂的軍事占領，只存在戰爭狀態未結束狀態，在國際法上，合約締約完成就不存在什麼軍事 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:44 AM
他用翻譯機還翻得比你正確..

-.-你只翻了一小段...裝傻做什麼?

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 01:47 AM
中國有簽署舊金山和約嗎...

中華民國也沒簽舊金山和約吧...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 01:47 AM
傻B，所謂的台灣地位未定論，無非就是相鑽中日合約的空子。其實給你講在法理上一點也站不住腳，因為中日合 ...

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-9 01:44 AM
日本時代的選舉, 那是地方選舉, 無關政權更替; 而目前台灣選舉, 是全國大選, 是直接更迭元首與國會組成.

...

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-9 02:01 AM
說鑽中日合約的空子, 恐怕不合史實. 當年日本投降不久, 中國就發生共產革命, 國民黨政治前途未卜.

已目 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 01:52 AM
中國沒有簽署舊金山合約，但美國簽了，所以美日不存在戰爭狀態，也就不存在戰爭占領的問題。這還要解釋。 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:10 AM
對啊，我真的對豬彈琴！

美日戰爭已經結束了，但是美國軍政府的代表還佔領著台灣啊...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:11 AM
再給傻B將一遍。軍事占領只存在戰爭時期！軍事占領只存在戰爭時期！只存在戰爭時期
豬到底是哪個字不明白 ...

有爭議的佔領

以下為一些被認為是軍事佔領的例子，但是這種狀態被某一方質疑。

納戈爾諾-卡拉巴赫 — 被亞美尼亞佔領，是亞塞拜然的合法領土。[7]
喬治亞領土的佔領——南奧塞梯地區與阿布哈茲，被俄羅斯所質疑（佔領過程從1992年開始，並於2008年「結束」）。
台灣、澎湖 — 當年同盟國英國指出台灣、澎湖是同盟國分配由中華民國佔領[8]，美國也表示中華民國自1945年開始佔領台灣、澎湖[9]。但2015年時以馬英九為首的中華民國政府否認佔領之說並主張當年已光復台灣[10]。
戈蘭高地 — 以色列在1967年中從敘利亞手中佔領，「事實上」被以色列於1981年吞併（但聯合國明確表示不承認，參見戈蘭高地）。
加薩走廊[11][12] — 在1948年由埃及佔領（在1956年蘇伊士運河危機中以色列佔領4個月），1967年由以色列佔領。
      2005年以色列以色列單方面提出脫離計劃，撤出了定居者以及地面部隊，但是幾個國際組織對加薩走廊是否被佔領這個問題上仍有爭議。
約旦河西岸[13] — 在第一次中東戰爭中由約旦佔領並於1950年被吞併，1965年被以色列佔領。
      約旦於1988年在巴勒斯坦解放組織發表聲明，做出主權讓渡。
      東耶路撒冷在1967年被以色列吞併，（1980年在以色列《基本法》中規定併入以色列），但是聯合國與歐盟表示不承認吞併。
西撒哈拉 — 摩洛哥與波利薩里奧陣線及阿拉伯撒哈拉民主共和國對此地區存在爭議，後者認為該地區處於被佔領狀態。
南千島群島：國後島、擇捉島、齒舞群島、色丹島 — 1945年被蘇聯吞併（蘇聯方面表示在問題上沒有商談的餘地）。
克什米爾 — 部分由巴基斯坦控制，部分由中華人民共和國控制、部分由印度控制，伊斯蘭瑪巴德、北京與新德里方面都聲稱對其部分或者全部擁有主權。
賽普勒斯：島嶼北部北賽普勒斯與1974年土耳其入侵賽普勒斯之後被佔領（參見賽普勒斯問題）。[14]

參見

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:16 AM
@@可是台灣也被維基百科列入有爭議的軍事佔領案例中耶..

蔣中正拿著美國的軍事命令來佔領台灣並持續 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:15 AM
未定個屁，前面也說了，哪怕是退到一千步，承認在舊金山合約后，台灣是無主之地。那麼根據國際法的先占和 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:16 AM
@@可是台灣也被維基百科列入有爭議的軍事佔領案例中耶..

蔣中正拿著美國的軍事命令來佔領台灣並持續 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:18 AM
我的天，維基百科。啊就是豬也能改一筆的東西拿來做證據

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:19 AM
台灣的主權被移轉到中華民國???我笑了..

美國日本都沒有承認你這個說法...甚至你的祖國中國也不承認這種 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:04 AM
日治時代的選舉不是地方選舉啊,那不是代表地方,是在日本國會代表整個台灣,林獻堂是台灣在貴族院的代表,擁 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:22 AM
豬連英語都看不懂，又可以代表全世界了，服了

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:19 AM
台灣的主權被移轉到中華民國???我笑了..

美國日本都沒有承認你這個說法...甚至你的祖國中國也不承認這種 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:06 AM
不說了就是一個空子，中日簽合約討論台灣問題時，日本就說自己依照舊金山條約已經對台灣不擁有主權了，不 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:25 AM
全世界主要的國家都沒有承認中華民國對台灣的主權,包括你家的中國...

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-9 02:27 AM
日本不擁有, 但的確並無指定交付, 這是歷史事實, 其他佐證都無能替代正式條約.

目前台灣已經民主化, 國 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:25 AM
全世界主要的國家都沒有承認中華民國對台灣的主權,包括你家的中國...

52國承認中華人民共和國對台灣的主權主張；另有美、日和加拿大等29個國家用相對模糊語言表達中華人民共和國對台灣的主權宣示

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:29 AM
主要國家不承認中華民國對台灣的主權，那是因為中華民國又被中華人民共和國繼承了，自然也繼承了台灣主權 ...

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-9 02:22 AM
日本時代, 台灣是日本的一部分, 全台灣的代表也只是在日本中央的地方代表而已.

一些弊案, 甚至對馬英九 ...

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-9 02:33 AM
蠻有趣的, 中華民國在台灣還沒死呢, 中華人民共和國要繼承什麼?

你在講笑話嗎?

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:31 AM
戰后台灣歸中華民國，政權完成交替后歸中華人民共和國。舉例？
台灣前任地區前領導人馬博士已經替我舉例了 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:29 AM
主要國家不承認中華民國對台灣的主權，那是因為中華民國又被中華人民共和國繼承了，自然也繼承了台灣主權 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:36 AM
國際繼承並不需要政權的完全死亡。這個才是常識。當然，在不遠的將來也可以徹底解決這個問題， ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:37 AM
中華民國跟中華人民共和國...光字數就不一樣了吧??

你的眼睛在哪裡...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:36 AM
國際繼承並不需要政權的完全死亡。這個才是常識。當然，在不遠的將來也可以徹底解決這個問題，另外，其他 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:39 AM
哦繼承關系還要政權的字數一樣，真是豬的有一發明啊。困了，不繼續逗豬了 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:42 AM
我覺得你是不是誤會什麼了？？

先別說繼承，中華民國的憲法領土從頭到尾都沒有台灣！！台灣從頭到尾都不 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:46 AM
這也不是字數的問題,這完全不是同一個東東啊．．
不然我把述敘改成日本人民共和國,所以那些國家就承認日 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:48 AM
46年11月28日，國民大會第三次會議中報告《中華民國憲法草案內容要點說明》：“第四條關于領土之規定，五 ...

chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-9 02:54 AM
中華民國憲法領土是繼承自五五憲草的!!!
這個大家都知道,但是要擴張中華民國領土是必須召開國民大會的

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:53 AM
這次是裝傻了，即便是豬的智商，也不會搞不懂政權繼承不只是名字不同啊。當然不是同一個東西，只是主權繼 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:48 AM
46年11月28日，國民大會第三次會議中報告《中華民國憲法草案內容要點說明》：“第四條關于領土之規定，五 ...

阿可樂樂發表於 2017-3-9 02:56 AM
收回? 收回什麼? 有國際條約嗎? 依國際法, 保障住民自決.

中華人民共和國一無國際條約, 二無台灣民意同 ...

revee1977 發表於 2017-3-9 02:58 AM
開羅宣言啊，這好像不需要講吧，你要是都這麼無知，我沒精力給你掃盲